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Abstract. Our finding contributes towards the understanding of movements regarding the 
adoption of corporate governance practice in emerging countries such as Romania and its 
impact on business performances of a company. 
We have developed two econometric models to assess the business performances of the 
companies listed on Bucharest Stock Exchange, in order to point out the impact of cor-
porate governance on business performances. Our results are inconsistent for the period 
2001–2011, but if we consider only 2011, the results document a positive correlation 
between corporate governance quality and market value of companies, such it is reflected 
by Tobin’s Q. Therefore, our results contribute to the studies relating corporate gover-
nance and business performances, as it confirms a positive relationship between the two 
variables which appears once the Romanian emerging economy has began to adopt the 
best corporate governance practices.
Firstly, our research has important implications for managers in order to know that the 
adoption of the best corporate governance practices could contribute to the financial suc-
cess of the firm. Secondly, the results are useful for any investor who needs to consider 
the quality of corporate governance as a good predictor for the best rate of return of theirs 
investments. Moreover, our findings have also implications on policy-makers and regula-
tory authorities in European developing countries and offer them a barometer of adopting 
the best corporate governance practices in European space.
Keywords: corporate governance, business performance, statistical hypothesis, regres-
sion, Romanian market, Comply or Explain Statement. 
JEL Classification: M21, M48, M14, C12, C31, C51.
Introduction
The term corporate governance has emerged in common usage in the 70’s, in the United 
States, in the middle of the Watergate scandal, when it was revealed that U.S. compa-
nies were involved in U.S. politics, by making contributions to various political par-
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ties. Later, at the end of the twentieth century, financial scandals like Guinness 1986, 
Poly Peck International 1989, Maxwell 1991, BCCI 1991, Enron 2001, Allied Irish 
Bank 2002, WorldCom 2002, Xerox 2002, Merrill Lynch 2002, Parmalat 2003/2004, 
Andersen 2001/2002, have disrupted the financial world and raised serious issues of 
trust concerning corporate governance systems. Uncontrolled development of financial 
innovations, especially derivatives, contributed to the dematerialization of business op-
erations and favoured the creative accounting practices designed to manipulate those 
who analyze financial statements (Le Roy, Marchesnay 2005). 
Sustainable development and, consequently, globalization require new performance 
standards, that go beyond economic goals. In the new context of sustainable develop-
ment, new social and environmental standards come to complete the business perfor-
mances. Nowdays, more than ever the ethical dimension of business is increasingly 
“the object of debate by business scholars, as well as by business people” (Dinu 2008).
Under the new economic development framework, especially concerning the organiza-
tion, there is change of business management approaches under the corporate govern-
ance systems. 
1. Corporate governance in Romania
Once the benefits of corporate governance practices have been understood and assimi-
lated by the developed countries, the developing ones have begun to adopt “the best 
practices” in corporate governance, especially because this need is acutely felt with the 
changes required by the transition to a market economy (Achim, Borlea 2013).
In 2001, the OECD with the support of USAID, developed a specific program to im-
prove corporate governance in Romania. The OECD/USAID views envisaged by the 
program were pointing out the following objectives: (i) evaluate corporate governance 
in Romania; (ii) offer a set of key recommendations for improving corporate governance 
in Romania and bring it closer to the international standard of the OECD Principles; 
(iii) identify needed technical assistance in the area of corporate governance; (iv) improve 
the understanding of present corporate governance practices in Romania, informing the 
international community about progressive national reform initiatives; and (v) facilitate 
full Romanian access to the ongoing international dialogue on corporate governance. In 
conducting the assessment and program formulation, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance was considered the benchmark (OECD 2001; Popa et al. 2009). The key 
recommendations constituted a comprehensive agenda for reform, including legisla-
tive changes, enforcement, institution building and private behaviour/capacity building. 
After an unsuccessful attempt in 2001, in 2008 BSE has adopted a new Corporate 
Governance Code which is based on the OECD principles of corporate governance. 
The code came into force from the financial year 2009 and it is voluntarily applied by 
companies traded on the regulated market operated by BSE. Companies that decide to 
entirely or partially adopt the Code must annually submit to BSE a statement of compli-
ance or non-compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance (“Comply or Explain 
Statement”) stating that the recommendations have actually been implemented and also 
the way of implementation (Bucharest Stock Exchange 2008).
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2. Empirical results regarding the correlation between  
corporate governance and business performance 
The literature abounds with studies on the impact of effective corporate governance on 
company performance. Regarding the emerging countries, the consulting firm McKinsey 
(2001) carried out a study on the topic of awareness of institutional investors in emerg-
ing countries (Asia, South-Eastern Europe and Latin American) concerning corporate 
governance. The study shows that these investors gave at least the same importance to 
information on corporate governance as to financial information in investment deci-
sions, plus they are willing to pay an added value for companies that apply and respect 
corporate governance standards. In South-Eastern Europe and Africa this addition can 
be up to 30% of market capitalization.
One year later (2002) Standard & Poor’s conducted a study regarding the influence of 
corporate governance best practices on business performance, by using a sample of 
1,600 companies listed on major stock exchanges around the world, representing 75% 
of the world stock market. The results of the study are emphasizing a strong correlation 
between the level of transparency provided through annual reports and market risk as 
wells as the market value (measured by PBR- Price to Book Ratio). 
There are a lot of results that investigate the correlation between corporate governance 
and business performance, hence in Appendix 1 we reflect our exhaustive research upon.
3. Research objectives, methodology and data
3.1. Research objectives
Firstly, we are going to test various hypotheses in order to find how corporate govern-
ance system influences on the adoption of corporate social responsibility and also on 
the companies’ performance, in Romanian economy. Further, the findings from this 
research will be used to create a general model for assessing the overall performance 
of Romanian companies, revealing correlations in various dimensions of performance. 
Consequently, our research objectives can be structured as follows:
A. Secondary objectives of the research:
a) Developing a corporate governance score, applicable for the Romanian economy.
b) Testing the hypothesis which refers to reflecting the impact of adopting the good 
corporate governance practices on the corporate social responsibility activities.
c) Testing the hypothesis which refers to reflecting the impact of adopting the good 
corporate governance practices on the choice to report a “Comply or Explain 
Statement”.
d) Testing the hypothesis which refers to the impact of the adoption of good corporate 
governance practices on financial performance (overall financial performance, 
growth rates, liquidity ratios, leverage ratio, level of investment propensity).
B. The general objective of the empirical research consists in developing an economet-
ric model for assessing the overall performance of the Romanian companies.
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3.2. Methodology and data 
In determining the sample we started from the companies traded on the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange (BSE). At the end of 2012, the BSE traded 106 companies, classified into four 
categories: I (28), II (52), III (1) and unlisted (26). From the total number of companies 
we removed the unlisted ones because they are not likely to comply with BSE (so they 
do not draw and report the “Comply or Explain Statement”). Thus, 81 companies listed 
on BSE remained in our sample (categories I, II and III respectively). Additionally, we 
eliminated the financial institutions (banks) and other foreign companies. The final valid 
sample consists of 76 companies listed on BSE. 
3.2.1. Assesing a corporate governance index
In evaluating the quality of corporate governance system we will rely on the results 
of numerous studies which enhance that the main component of corporate governance 
consists in transparency and disclosure practices (Cromme 2005; Karamanou, Vafeas 
2005; Bhat et al. 2006; Aksu, Kosedag 2006; Junarso 2006, Ben Ali 2008; Kuznecovs, 
Pal 2011; Desoky, Mousa 2012; Ionascu, Olimid 2012). It is also relevant that the in-
ternational rating agencies (Standards & Poor’s, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia-CLSA) 
pay particular attention to the transparency and dissemination practices of information 
about the company, as an important component in order to develop a corporate govern-
ance score. 
In this regard we use “Comply or Explain Statement” as a main channel to reflect the 
transparency and disclosure practices about the corporate governance system of a com-
pany. Therefore, we use publicly available “Comply or Explain Statement”1 submitted 
by all publicly quoted companies on BSE and use answers provided by the companies to 
create a score that measured the goodness of their corporate governance systems. If the 
companies do not prepare such a statement, data is taken from the documents published 
by the BSE listed companies on their own website (directors’ annual reports, financial 
reports or any other useful documents or information publicly available).
Inspiring from Standard and Poor’s methodology, we develop a corporate governance 
score by reclasifying the 51 questions contained in the “Comply or Explain Statement” 
of BSE into five main area of investigation as follows:
i) Governance structure-G: 10 questions;
ii) Investor relations-I: 10 questions;
iii) Board and management-B: 20 questions;
iv) Financial disclosure-F: 10 questions;
v) Corporate social responsibility-CSR: 1 question (the 51th- the last one).
In order to asses the governance score, we will use all the questions included in the 
“Comply or Explain Statement” except the last one, regarding CSR activities. This is 
because performing such kind of activities is not directly a component of corporate 
governance system but rather a large concept that reflects if companies adopt the long- 
term sustainability strategies (see Kolk, Pinkse 2009). 
1 Available from Internet: http://www.bvb.ro/info/Rapoarte/Diverse/Comply%20or%20Explain%20
Statement.pdf 
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At each of the 50 questions companies answer with YES/NO and if the answer is NO 
they have to EXPLAIN. In order to compute a corporate governance score, we will give 
1 point for each answer with YES and 0 points for NO. Thus, the minimum governance 
score obtained by a company is 0 points and the maximum is 50 points.
Since the application of the “Comply or Explain Statement” is relatively new in Roma-
nia (starting with the financial year 2009), it takes some time for companies to comply 
with the new requirements. 
Thus, only since 2011, the concerns to provide corporate governance reports are consist-
ent and therefore representative for our study. Therefore we analyzed the “Comply or 
Explain Statements” for the financial year 2011, statements that companies voluntarily 
reported to the BSE together with the financial reports on the following year (2012).
3.2.2. Working hypotheses, variables and data
In order to achieve the secondary objectives of our research, we firstly intend to test 
the statistical hypotheses validated in the scientific literature regarding the impact of 
good corporate practices on the manifestation of corporate social responsibility as well 
as on various financial indicators (financial performance). The working hypotheses are 
presented below together with a description of the variables used in each case:
H1: The adoption of good corporate governance practices is reflected in behaviour of 
companies to report the “Comply or Explain Statement”. 
a) Numerical variable CG = Corporate governance score.
b) Dummy variable CE = Reports “Comply or Explain Statement” (YES or NO).
H2: The adoption of good corporate governance practices is reflected in the corporate 
social responsibility policy conducted by companies. 
a) CG, or the individual variables that compound it: G = Governance structure, I = 
The investor relations, B = Board and management, F = Financial disclosure.
b) Dummy variable CSR = Corporate Social Responsibility (YES, if company 
performs CSR activities and NO, if company does not perform CSR activities).
H3: The adoption of good corporate governance practices has an impact on the overall 
financial performance of the company. 
a) CG.
b) Numerical variables CAP = market capitalization, PBR = Price to book ratio 
(Market value/Book value), TQ = Tobin’s ((stock market capitalization + debt)/
assets), ROA = Return on assets (net income/assets), ROE = Return on equity 
(Net profit/equity).
H4: The adoption of good corporate governance practices has an impact on the eco-
nomic growth rates.
a) CG.
b) Numerical variable GROW = Growth rate of turnover (turnover variation/basic 
turnover).
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H5: The adoption of good corporate governance practices has an impact on the degree 
of company’s liquidity.
a) CG.
b) Numerical variable FLEX = Financial flexibility (working capital/assets) and 
CW = Cash flow to assets (Cash flow/Assets).
H6: The adoption of good corporate governance practices is reflected in high levels of 
financial leverage.
a) CG.
b) Numerical variable LEV = Financial leverage (total debt/equity).
H7: The adoption of good corporate governance practices is reflected in a lower level 
of investment propensity.
a) CG.
b) Numerical variable EFA = Equity to fixed assets ratio (Shareholder equity/fixed 
assets).
The hypotheses made were tested through two types of methods: the correlation coef-
ficients and the ANOVA analysis of variances (Buiga 2011). 
In order to achieve the general objective of our research we considered as a proxy for 
the endogenous variables the performance of the company on the market, namely: 
Market capitalization-CAP, Price to book ratio (ratio between market value and book 
value)-PBR and Tobin’s Q – TQ.
We selected two groups of indicators as exogenous variables:
a) internal (economic) performance achieved by the company, represented in the 
scientific literature by: Return on assets (Net profit/Total assets) – ROA; Return 
on equity (Net profit/ Shareholder equity) – ROE; Leverage ratio (Debts/ Share-
holder equity) – LEV; Equity-to-fixed-assets ratio (Shareholder equity/fixed as-
sets) – EFA; Flexibility ratio (Net working capital/Total assets) – FLEX; Growth 
ratio (Turnover deviaton/Basis Turnover) – GROW; Cash flow return on assets 
(Cash flow/total assets) – CW;
b) the corporate governance index (CG) and the corporate social responsibility ac-
tivities adopted by the company (CSR).
The average values or the standards deviations were computed for each of the variables 
for the period under analysis and cross-section analysis was applied to construct the 
models. The multiple regression procedures were applied to estimate models such as:
 Y = β0 +βi Xi + ɛi.
All the necessary validation procedures were run to insure the statistical significance of 
the models resulted (Dragos 2008). 
The financial reports of the companies in the sample were used to evaluate financial 
performance. The time span is 2001–2011.
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4. Research results 
4.1. Hypotheses testing 
The analysis revealed in the following results in what regards the tested hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 is accepted on our sample at a significance level of 1%. The correlation 
coefficient resulted from the analysis has a value of 0.683, with a critical value Sig. = 
0.000. The same Sig. value was returned by the Fisher test in the ANOVA analysis. 
Moreover the group descriptive statistics clearly show that the average governance score 
for those who report the “Comply or Explain Statement” is triple than of those who 
do not (Appendix 2). We can thus conclude that a strong corporate governance system 
(reflected in a high score of corporate governance) is correlated with the management’s 
decision to report the “Comply or Explain Statement”. 
Results are in accordance to those found in the scientific literature (McKinsey 2001; 
Standard & Poor’s 2002; Aksu, Kosedag 2006; Stilgbauer 2010; Fulop 2011).
Results are more or less the same in what regards hypothesis 2. The relationship is also 
statistically significant at 99% level – it is positive and medium in intensity (correlation 
coefficient = 0.651, Sig.= 0.002). 
Taking into consideration the fact that corporate governance score is computed based on 
four indicators, we ran the above analysis individually, for each component and level of 
social responsibility, in order to rank the four areas of governance based on their cor-
relation with the level of corporate social responsibility practices. The same value of 
Sig. in all the four cases (0.000) provides validation of working hypotheses to a confi-
dence level of 99%. Regarding the actual relationship between each component of CG 
and CSR, the connection is direct and of medium intensity in all the cases. However, 
the highest coefficient is for aspects related to the Board and management (B) (0.642), 
while aspects related to the Investors relations (I) are the ones with the lowest influ-
ence (0.522). The coefficients of Governance structure (G) and Financial transparency 
(F) are 0.607 and 0.593 respectively. Social responsibility practices positively influence 
corporate governance and conversely, a high quality system of corporate governance 
is reflected in the adoption of a high degree of corporate social responsibility, with the 
strongest influence given by the Board and management component (B). 
Results are consisted with McLaren (2004), Monks et al. (2004), Aguilera et al. (2006), 
Sjöström (2008), Kolk and Pinkse (2009).
Based on the results of the correlation analysis, we can conclude the following:
a) Between corporate governance (CG) and stock performance indicators (CAP, PBR 
and TQ) is a significant direct relationship of low intensity (95% confidence level). 
The most “powerfull” connection would be the one between CG and PBR score 
(0.27) followed by CG vs. CAP and CG vs. TQ (0.239, each).
b) When assessing GC vs. economic performance, the strongest relationship is be-
tween CG and ROA. It is direct and of medium intensity (0.357 > 0.3) and it is 
accepted at a significance level of 1%. Regarding the correlation with ROE, it is 
not statistically significant for the present sample.
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Hypothesis 3 is accepted on the level of performance represented by ROA (medium 
intensity), PBR (low intensity) and CAP and TQ (very weak intensity). When the com-
pany’s performance is represented by ROE the assumption is invalidated. A positive 
relationship between good corporate practices and financial performances has been es-
tablished by numerous expert studies: McKinsey (2001), Standard & Poor’s (2002), 
Klapper and Love (2004), Doidge et al. (2007), Al-Hussain and Johnson 2009, Stilg-
bauer 2010, Kusnecovs 2011, Feleagă et al. (2011), Arcot and Bruno (2011), Agrawal 
and Knoeber (2012).
The weakest significance level (10%) appears for the relationship between growth rate 
and governance score (correlation coefficient = 0.209, Sig. = 0.071) (The turnover is 
also in a weak direct relationship with the governance (correlation coefficient = 0.263) 
but the result is accepted with a probability of 95%. In other words, the adoption of 
good corporate practice generates an increase in the company’s activity (expressed with 
a growth of the turnover and its growth rate). In conclusion, hypothesis 4 is accepted 
at a low intensity (below 0.3). Results are in line with those obtained by Klapper and 
Love (2004), Doidge et al. 2007, Agrawal and Knoeber (2012).
Hypothesis 5 is rejected in our analysis. Results differ by the scientific literature, being 
devoted to the positive impact of good corporate governance practices on the degree of 
liquidity of the company (Eng, Mak 2003; Li, Qi 2008; Stiglbauer 2010). The adoption 
of good corporate governance practices is not reflected in the liquidity of the company. 
The analysis has returned very low levels of the correlation coefficients, both for finan-
cial flexibility and cash flow through assets (0.027 and 0.029). 
There is an insignificant very low and indirect connection between corporate governance 
and financial leverage (–0.156). Thus, the correlation shows that the adoption of good 
corporate governance practices is reflected in a low level of indebtedness, evidenced 
by the financial leverage indicator (debt/equity). In conclusion, hypothesis 6 is also re-
jected on our sample. Thus, Romanian companies have not been identified with such a 
correlation, debated in the literature (Jensen 1986; Driffield et al. 2005; Cremers, Vinay 
2005; Kuznecovs, Pal 2011). The next hypothesis (H7) is also rejected, the correlation 
between corporate governance score and propensity to investment being statistically 
not significant.
We can therefore say that the adoption of good corporate governance practices is reflect-
ed in a higher aversion risk, thus a balanced investment policy. Results converge with 
those reached by a number of authors, such as: Jensen and Meckling (1976), Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003), Arcot and Bruno (2011).
4.2. Constructing a model for global business performance
Regarding the overall objective of the research to develop an econometric model to 
assess the overall performance, the analysis was made in two steps.
For the first, given the large number of variables used and the long analyzed period 
(2001–2011), running the tests of correlation using variable averages, leads to incon-
sistent results. Therefore, the next step was to test the correlations using the standard 
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deviations of the variables (as a measure of volatility). Applying the procedures upon 
the level of volatility, although many of the variables selected were rejected from the 
model, some significant connections still remained.
Thus, of the three endogenous variables (CAP, PBR and TQ) the correlations persist at 
a significant level only for the PBR (Appendix 3). Next we retain as the only endog-
enous variable the PBR. In what the remaining exogenous variables are concerned, after 
running the tests only four variables remain significant: ROE, LEV, GROW and CAP. 
The adjusted R2 of 0.355 shows that the exogenous variables determine the endogenous 
variables on a rate of 35.5%. The model is statistically significant (Sig = 0.000). The 
standardized form of the econometric model is as follows:
 PBR = –0.425ROE +0.366 LEV – 0.893 GROW + 1.125CAP.
Unfortunately, for the analyzed period (2001–2011), we couldn’t reach a statistically 
consistent econometric model of the overall performance of the company to incorporate 
a large number of variables validated by the scientific literature as being significant for 
determining the overall performance (stock) of the company. To the variables rejected 
we can also add the ones related to the adoption of good practices (corporate govern-
ance) and corporate social responsibility.
The unconvincing conclusions that we reached, in relation to the set expectations, lead 
us to the evaluation of the same correlations, but only for 2011 (most recent year in 
which it is assumed that the practices of corporate governance and CSR are most in-
tense, with the need to converge to EU requirements).
The results of the research for 2011 show an adjusted R2 0f 0.433. The exogenous vari-
ables are best correlated with the endogenous variable which reflects the stock perfor-
mance, TQ. Among the exogenous variables selected, there are a significant number of 
variables that remain such as: ROA, ROE, LEV, EFA, and CW. 
The econometric model that assesses the company’s performance represented by the 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) is:
TQ = –1. 673 ROA + 0.475 ROE + 0.038 LEV – 0.203 EFA + 0.4999 FLEX +
     0.009 GROW + 1.242 CW + 0.003 CG + 0.182 CSR + 0.556.
The econometric model for the global performance reflects the highest influences of 
ROA and CW. However the type of influence is different. CSR and CG have a weak 
but positive influence on market value reflected by Tobin’s Q, even these variables are 
not statistically significant. 
The results on the structure of the econometric model meant to assess the overall perfor-
mance of the company appear in 2011, as being on the same level with the results de-
voted by the scientific literature. The long analysis period (2001–2011) with fluctuating 
results in the emerging economy in a country like Romania, which is interrupted by the 
global financial crisis, causes the generation of less consistent results that can be embed-
ded in an econometric solid model. In 2011 only, results appear to be more balanced 
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and more relevant, and we can build a consistent global evaluation model including also 
the corporate governance influence. The obtained results document a positive impact 
of corporate governance on business performances, measured by Tobin’s Q. Therefore, 
the obtained results are in accordance to other previous studies in literature, reflecting 
a positive correlation between the two variables (Black et al. 2005, 2006; Ficici, Aybar 
2012; Fallatah, Dickins 2012; Wang 2014).
Conclusions
Corporate governance is increasingly recognized as a key element in attracting invest-
ments and increasing the business performance and competitiveness of a company. 
A first objective of our research consist in developing a methodology for assessing the 
quality of corporate governance, including an index of corporate governance, adapted 
to the national development framework of the Romanian economy and also to the Cor-
porate Governance Code of the Bucharest Stock Exchange.
Some important statistical hypotheses related to the impact of good corporate practices 
on companies’ performance, which have already been confirmed by the literature, have 
been tested on the Romanian economy. The results have materialized in the acceptance 
of four out of the seven hypotheses reflecting that Romanian companies increasingly 
more the need to adopt the best practices of corporate governance and “theirs trajectory 
is a positive and a progressive one” (Bota-Avram 2012).
Also, we have developed two econometric models to assess the global performances 
of the company. For the 2001–2011 period, results based on cross-section analysis are 
inconsistent and cannot be materialized in an econometric model that incorporates a 
significant number of high factors confirmed by the literature as statistically significant 
in determining the company’s performance. Among the variables rejected by the model, 
there are the variables related to the adoption of good practices in corporate governance. 
Results are more consistent when assessing only 2011, when we identify a positive cor-
relation between corporate governance and business performances reflected by Tobin’s 
Q, even if it is not yet statistically significant. 
This research contributes towards the understanding of movements regarding the adop-
tion of corporate governance practice in emerging countries such as Romania and its 
impact on business performances of a company. 
Our research further contributes to the studies relating corporate governance and busi-
ness performances, as it confirms a positive relationship between the two variables 
which runs once the Romanian emerging economy began to realize the need to adopt 
best practices in corporate activity.
Our results have important implications mainly for managers in order to know that the 
adoption of the best practices in governance could contribute to the financial success of 
the firm. Also, the results suggest that investors must consider the quality of corporate 
governance as a good predictor of the best rate of return of theirs investments and they 
“need to be extra cautious when investing in firms with less stringent corporate gover-
468
M.-V. Achim et al. Corporate governance and business performance: evidence for the Romanian economy
nance mechanisms” (Ficici, Aybar 2012). Moreover, our results have also implications 
on policy-makers and regulatory authorities in European developing countries and give 
them a barometer of adopting the best practices in governance in European space.
The limitations of the paper could consist in the short period in which we can talk 
about corporate governance in Romania, as European emerging country. Since the ap-
plication of the Comply or Explain Statement started only with the financial year 2009, 
we use 2011 year when the concerns to provide corporate governance reports are as 
consistent is possible. As the principles of corporate governance will be better known 
and adopted by developing economy (including also Romania), future studies will run 
on a longer period of applying best practices in corporate governance in Romanian 
emerging market. 
Another limit of the present research could be the fact that by using Comply or Ex-
plain Statement, some main characteristics of corporate governance are not very well 
encapsulated (such as age diversity, gender or nationality of board members or block 
and institutional ownership issues) and therefore the quality of corporate governance 
could be somehow distorted. Future studies will be developed by completing the score 
of corporate governance with many other variables which are not reflected in Comply 
or Explain Statement, in order to get more robustness results.
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APPENDIX 2
Group descriptive statistics – corporate governance score (CG) vs. reporting “Comply  
or Explain Statement” (A) and CSR activities (B)
N Mean of CG Minimum of CG Maximum of CG
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
No 22 19 11.68 10.26 0 0 49 38
Yes 54 57 36.44 35.61 8 5 49 49
Total 76 76 29.28 29.28 0 0 49 49
Source: own calculation using SPSS 17.0.
APPENDIX 3
Econometric model PBV vs. CAP, ROE, LEV, GROW
Coefficients




(Constant) 1.146 0.203 – 5.655 0.000
ROE –0.767 0.289 –0.425 –2.651 0.010
LEV 0.031 0.014 0.366 2.278 0.026
GROW –2.248 0.439 –0.893 –5.118 0.000
CAP 0.000 0.000 1.125 6.441 0.000
Source: own calculation using SPSS 17.0.
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